Dull but Important: When Is an Appeal “Brought” – Eskander v General Medical Council [2026] EWCA Civ 372

Has an appeal been “brought” in time if the appellant’s notice is received by the court in time, but the proper fee is not paid until after the 28-day limit has expired? It is not a very exciting question, but an appellant’s right to appeal may rest on it.

Following her suspension by the MPT, Dr Eskander attempted to appeal to the High Court. She sent an Appellant’s Notice by e-mail to the Administrative Court Office in London on the last day of her appeal period. She did not, however, pay the necessary fee. She did so in due course when the omission was pointed out to her.

The General Medical Council (“the GMC”) applied to strike out her appeal on the basis it was out of time. The High Court duly did so. Dr Eskander applied for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Initially, there was no dispute that the appeal had been brought out of time. Gupta v GMC [2020] EWHC 38 (Admin) stated “an Appellant’s Notice requires a fee, or an application for remission of the fee“. Without that, the appeal had not been properly brought. This was repeated in Rakoczy v GMC [2022] EWHC 890 (Admin). The issue was whether Dr Eskander could bring herself within the High Court’s very limited power to extend time.

Then, on 4 March 2026, the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215. The court held that, for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980, an action had been brought in time when the claim form had been delivered to the court office before the expiry of the limitation period, even though the full fee had not been paid. Dr Eskander’s counsel applied successfully to amend the grounds of appeal accordingly.

Siniakovich concerned a claim for defamation. The Limitation Act required that the claim be “brought” in time, not filed or issued. Mr Siniakovich’s solicitors had delivered to the court office in time. Andrews LJ noted the payment of a fee was:

“a purely administrative act which does not affect the substance of the claim. It has no impact on the putative defendant save to the extent that …it may cause some delay in the issue of the claim form …  so that the defendant finds out about the existence of the claim later than they might otherwise have done…

… Can Parliament really be taken to have intended that a defendant should be entitled to raise a defence of time-bar to such a claim, even if the claim form received by the court within the time allowed by statute was otherwise perfectly in order …, I do not believe so…“

In Dr Eskander’s case, the issue was whether this reasoning applied to a GMC appeal as well. The GMC argued it did not. Firstly, it relied on the fact Dr Eskander did not pay any fee. The court rejected this, taking the view that there was no logical distinction between paying part of the fee or none of it.

Secondly, the GMC argued there was a material distinction between the Limitation Act and the Medical Act. The Medical Act provides that if no appeal is brought within 28 days, the sanction will come into effect. Otherwise, the sanction will come into effect if the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed. The GMC observed a gap would exist if an appeal was brought but no fee paid, and in consequence, the claim was not be issued by the court. In such a situation, the substantive sanction would not come into force. The appeal would not proceed since it had not been issued and, in the interim, the doctor could carry on practising (assuming there was no immediate order). The court accepted this difficulty did arise. However, it observed it was more unsatisfactory to attach different meanings to the same wording concerning limitation depending on which statute it appeared in. That would be a “recipe for chaos”. The court agreed with the approach taken in Siniakovich. The court office may take time to issue a claim. That does not mean a claim is not brought until it has done so. So if there is a delay issuing the claim because of a fee issue, that also cannot mean the claim has not been brought.

To address the lacuna, the Court of Appeal suggested a couple of possibilities. The court office could refuse to accept the Appeal Notice until the fee was paid. Potentially, the appeal had not then been “brought”. More promisingly, the court could tell the appellant that unless the fee was paid within a certain time, the appellant would be considered to have withdrawn the appeal.

These are issues for another day. The point is the rule in Gupta is overturned. One technical hurdle to bringing an appeal in time has been removed.