Nikita McNeill
Editor
Foreword
In this edition Paul Renteurs reviews the decision of the High Court in R (on the application of Matthew Campbell) v. HM Attorney General [2025] EWHC 1653 (Admin), now headed to the Supreme Court, to discuss whether it is possible, through judicial review, to challenge a refusal by the Attorney General to grant permission to apply to the High Court under Section 13 Coroners and Justice Act to quash the conclusion of an inquest and order a fresh inquest.
Whilst Iain Daniels considers the judgement in The King (on the application of Bhupinder Iffat Rizvi) v HM Assistant Coroner for South London, which serves as a salutary warning that the time limits for judicial review are to be observed, and the Court will not easily allow a challenge out of time by three months, even where resumption of the inquest itself had been delayed by many years.
Christina Russell and Eleanor Fox demonstrate the difficult line to be tread by any Inquiry, by comparing the Government’s attempts to appoint a Chair to the Grooming Gangs Inquiry to the resignation of the Chair to the Sheku Bayou Inquiry as it reached its home stretch. As Christina notes, the Government has yet to settle Terms of Reference or identify a Chair, with a panel of abuse survivors having objected to the candidates identified. Whilst Eleanor observes that the Sheku Bayoh Inquiry’s Chair’s decisions to meet privately with the family, in order to gain their confidence and engagement, led to his losing the confidence of the other core participants to the Inquiry.
Almost a quarter of a century after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the personal pain and tragedies of that day are still echoing through our legal systems. One such echo is a claim for judicial review that was brought by Matthew Campbell – the brother of Geoffrey Campbell, who was killed on 11 September 2001 – against the Attorney General.
The claim relates to the refusal of the Attorney General to authorise a claim (so-called Attorney General’s fiat) to order a fresh coroner’s inquest. This means of revisiting a coroner’s inquest after a conclusion has been reached by a coroner in a case is set out in section 13(1)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988, which provides that a fresh inquest may be ordered:
[…] where, on an application by or under the authority of the Attorney-General, the High Court is satisfied as respects a coroner […]
(b) where an inquest or an investigation has been held by him, that (whether by reason of fraud, rejection of evidence, irregularity of proceedings, insufficiency of inquiry, the discovery of new facts or evidence or otherwise) it is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice that an investigation (or as the case may by, another investigation) should be held.
On 29 January 2013 HM Coroner for West London concluded:
‘At 8.46am on 11 September 2001 the deceased was on the 106th floor of the North Tower of the World Trade Centre when an aircraft (AA11) was deliberately flown into the building, causing its collapse at 10.28am. This event was part of a coordinated attack by the Islamist militant group Al Qaeda.’
Matthew Campbell did not and does not accept that conclusion, or the terrible facts of those atrocities which most of us now accept as settled history. He believes that the North Tower collapsed as a result of…
This is a very recent and interesting case which acts as a useful practical example of how the Galbraith (plus) test is applied in inquests and, in particular, Article 2 inquests. It also once again emphasises the pitfalls and difficulties with judicial review applications.
The facts
The inquest concerned the murder of Sabina Rizvi in March 2003 as she drove away from Bexleyheath Police Station with her boyfriend, Mark Williams. Ms Rizvi was fatally shot and Mr Williams sustained a significant brain injury. The assailants were never identified, but Paul Asbury was convicted of murder and attempted murder.
The very substantial delay in the inquest was it seems due, at least in part, to the criminal proceedings and the initial decision not to resume the inquest following Mr Asbury’s conviction and thereafter as a result of what is somewhat opaquely described in the judgment as “a number of evidential, procedural and administrative complexities.” The very substantial delay in the inquest was, it seems, due at least in part to the criminal proceedings and the initial decision not to resume the inquest following Mr Asbury’s conviction, and thereafter as a result of what is somewhat opaquely described in the judgment as “a number of evidential, procedural and administrative complexities.”
The basis for resumption was whether the acts or omissions of the police were an arguable breach of the Osman operation duty, in essence the questions for determination on the Galbraith basis for the coroner, HHJ Angela Rafferty KC, were:
a) Whether the Police knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate threat to the life of Ms Rizvi.
b) Whether the Police knew that the risk arose from the criminal acts of Paul Asbury and his associates.
c) Whether the Police failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.
The coroner found on an Osman basis that there was a real and immediate risk to life, but that the Police did not know, nor should they have known that such a risk existed. Having found that, it followed that steps could not be taken to mitigate that…
A statutory Inquiry was announced by Keir Starmer in June this year. He said, “it will take a bit of time to set up”[1]. Those words turned out to be particularly prescient as we near the end of the year, with not even a chair appointed and the whole process of doing so apparently firmly back at square one, unlikely to conclude anytime soon now that all the candidates have withdrawn.
In abstract, a Statutory Inquiry seems like such a good idea: a fearless, independent chair examining a catastrophic event with the aim of finding out what happened and why, and making recommendations designed to prevent recurrence. The Inquiries Act 2005 gave Inquiry chairs real powers to compel evidence, with proper sanctions at their disposal for those who do not comply. Yet somehow, the current state of Inquiries appears to be an increasing state of paralysis. The effectiveness of Inquiries in terms of implementation of their recommendations is one end of the problem, and the Inquiry getting going at all is the other end.
The power to appoint a Chair rests with the Minister (section 4 of the Inquiries Act), as does the power to set terms of reference (section 5(1) of the Inquiries Act), albeit that any subsequent amendment requires the minister to consult with the Chair (section 5(4) of the Inquiries Act 2005). There are, of course, problems associated with these powers lying solely with the Minister – obvious conflicts of interest where state bodies might be scrutinised and potentially criticised. However, the experience of trying to appoint a Chair and set terms of reference for the Grooming Gangs inquiry suggests that there are no easy solutions. Here, attempts to involve victims and/or survivors in the establishment process spectacularly backfired when more and more of them resigned from the consultation, resulting ultimately in no candidates remaining prepared to assume the position of Chair.
The problem lies in the difficulty of obtaining consensus when naturally victims and/or survivors do not all have one voice, one perspective, or one opinion. On this occasion, the problem centred around the candidates’ backgrounds in the police and in social services. Some of the victims and/or survivors involved on the consultation panel felt that those backgrounds were inappropriate when there are serious allegations that these institutions’ reactions and/or inaction was part of the problem and enabled the abuse. That, of course, is a valid point of view – as is the contrary one that a background in one or other of those institutions could itself be valuable, enabling the chair to…
Introduction
This article examines the implications of the resignation of Lord Bracadale as Chair of the Sheku Bayoh public inquiry on 21 October 2025 over insurmountable concerns about the appearance of bias held by numerous core participants to the Inquiry.
Mr Bayoh died on 3 May 2015 after an incident in the street in Kirkcaldy involving officers of Police Scotland. The Inquiry has already heard 122 days of evidence, but with closing submissions still to be heard, the Inquiry will conclude before, and the report authored by a new Chair, to be appointed by the Scottish Ministers.
The Inquiry has already heard 122 days of evidence but, with closing submissions still to be heard, the Inquiry will conclude before, and the report authored by a new Chair, to be appointed by the Scottish Ministers.
“An appearance of bias” – meetings between Lord Bracadale and the family of Sheku Bayoh
Lord Bracadale’s resignation was prompted by concerns which stemmed from five private meetings that Lord Bracadale held with the family of Mr Bayoh. Those meetings were held without advising other core participants to the Inquiry. There was also some criticism about the provision of Inquiry documents to the family ahead of disclosure to core participants.
As a result, in June 2025, an application was made by the Scottish Police Federation and other core participants to the Inquiry which argued that Lord Bracadale ought to recuse himself. The application was advanced on the basis that the meetings Lord Bracadale had held with members of Mr Bayoh’s family without advising core participants gave rise to an appearance of bias. It was not suggested that his conduct was…
When the NMC recently applied for an extension to Ms Richmond’s interim order of conditions,…
Introduction This recent judgment of the High Court provides a practical roadmap where the prosecution…
