R v Llandudno Magistrates’ Court (ex parte Malone) [2025] EWHC 1740 (Admin)

Introduction

This recent judgment of the High Court provides a practical roadmap where the prosecution seeks an adjournment on the morning of trial.

The judgment confirms and reviews the Picton criteria as reflected in Criminal Practice Directions 2023 5.4, expanding in detail on the scope of the requirement for “rigorous scrutiny” of adjournment applications, and reviewing relevant recent authority.

Significantly, the decision emphasises that where the Crown has defeated a defence application to adjourn on an assurance the prosecution is “trial‑ready”, any later prosecution application to adjourn for lack of readiness should be refused—and if granted, that order is highly vulnerable to being quashed, with a real prospect of the High Court directing an acquittal.

Facts

Mr Malone was charged on 28 July 2024 with failing to provide a specimen of breath. At the first hearing (12 August), the defence pleaded “reasonable excuse” on the PET form and indicated PC Roberts would be required; the CPS was ordered to serve evidence by 9 September.

There were three witnesses of Mr Malone’s period in custody: PC Roberts, PS Hughes, and a custody nurse. The CPS queried on 5 September whether Roberts was required and received no reply. Shortly thereafter, the defence applied for an adjournment.

District Judge Jones refused on 25 September; at the hearing the CPS assured the court it was “trial-ready”. The statement of another officer, PS Hughes, reached the defence by email at 07:46 on the trial morning (4 October) and neither PS Hughes nor PC Roberts attended. Only the custody nurse was able to provide any evidence of Mr Malone’s conduct.

The CPS sought a same‑day adjournment, which the bench granted, stating in their reasons only that there had been “failings on both sides” and that an adjournment was “in the interests of justice.”

Restatement of the law

The judgment emphasises that the power to adjourn a summary trial at s. 10(1) Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, while a broad discretion, must be exercised in accordance with the Criminal Practice Directions 2023. Key principles from the directions are identified:

• Adjournments sought “on the day of trial” are to be exceptional; the starting point is that the hearing should proceed: CrimPD 5.4.3–5.4.5.
• “Rigorous scrutiny” of applications to adjourn and “cogent reasons” for granting such applications are mandatory: CrimPD 5.4.10.
• Where witness absence is relied upon, the court must “rigorously investigate” the steps taken to secure attendance: CrimPD 5.4.14.

The directions distil the factors identified by Jack J in Crown Prosecution Service v Picton [2006] EWHC 1108 (Admin) at [9]. Picton labels delay in summary justice “scandalous” and requires rigorous scrutiny of any late application.

The judgment contains a further review of recent authority emphasising the following principles:

• A decision to grant adjournment is unlawful where bench gives only a formulaic assertion that adjournment was “in the interests of justice”: citing R (Saunders) v Bristol Magistrates’ Court [2022] EWHC 2544 (Admin), cited at Malone [40]–[41].
• Even where either outcome could be rational, cogent reasons cannot be dispensed with: R (Thandi) v Sevenoaks MC [2023] EWHC 507 (Admin), cited at Malone [57]–[60].
• Inadequacy of reasons is itself a public‑law error; lengthy reasoning is not required, but the note must show that the Picton factors were grappled with: citing R (Rusu) v Northamptonshire MC [2023] EWHC 3290 (Admin), cited at Malone [48]–[49].

The ruling

Adjournment decision quashed as unlawful and irrational

The Court found that the bench failed to apply the “rigorous scrutiny” required by Picton and CrimPD 5.4. The justices’ reasons comprised only a short citation of “failings on both sides” and “the interests of justice.” The absence of express or implied engagement with the Picton factors made the decision unlawful.

Several critical prosecution errors were left unaccounted for by the bench. Among those were:

• The late service of PS Hughes’s statement, received by the defence at 07:46 on the trial morning.
• The assurance to the court at the hearing before DJ Jones on 25 September, that the prosecution was trial-ready, despite not having received this witness statement.
• The Crown’s failure to raise the question of PC Roberts’s attendance at the 25 September hearing, when both parties were present.

The bench fell into error by treating the position as symmetrical because the defence had not responded to the CPS email seeking confirmation of the witness requirement. This was “no proper analysis”: [58]

In particular, the bench did not engage with the fact that the defence’s own adjournment request had been refused ten days prior to trial. That refusal—secured after the Crown said it was ready—was a material part of the history of the case and should have informed the bench’s assessment. This was highly significant:

“There was a real scope for unfairness arising out of the fact that an aspect of the Prosecution’s successful opposition to the Claimant’s adjournment application had been the indication that the Prosecution was ready for the trial to go ahead when that assurance should not have been given and when the Prosecution then sought an adjournment of the trial.”

Eyre J accepted that, had the case turned solely on PC Roberts’s absence and had the Crown not previously resisted the defence application, an adjournment might have fallen “within the range of lawful and rational outcomes, albeit at its outer edge”.

But, he continued, the combination of (i) late service, (ii) unwarned witnesses, and (iii) the incorrect “trial‑ready” representation meant that, once the relevant factors were properly weighed, “the only proper conclusion would have been that the adjournment application should be refused”: [60].

Relief – the High Court’s remedial discretion after quashing

Eyre J considered whether the High Court may direct an acquittal only when refusal of the adjournment would inevitably have forced the Crown to offer no evidence. The CPS sought to rely on Thandi to argue for that narrow rule.

Eyre J’s analysis of Thandi concluded that there is no such limit on the court’s discretion: [65]. The “touchstone” in deciding the appropriate remedy is “the interests of justice and the potential for prejudice or unfairness to either party”: [66].

The four factors considered at [67]–[78] were decisive:

• The late service of PS Hughes’s statement and the failure to warn either officer were the operative reasons the trial collapsed: [74].
• Ten days before, the Crown had defeated the defence adjournment on the incorrect claim that it was fully prepared. Allowing the case to proceed now would reward that conduct: [74]–[75].
• While a fresh listing might have enabled the defence to obtain an expert report, it would also enable the Crown to call PC Roberts and PS Hughes and thus to enjoy the benefit of the adjournment now deemed by the court to be irrational and unlawful; to allow this would create a real perception of unfairness: [75].
• Lastly, the offence was summary‑only; any new trial would take place roughly eighteen months after the event, against a 77‑year‑old defendant with acknowledged health problems, diluting the public interest in prosecution: [76]–[77].

No single factor was conclusive, but together they meant that continuing to trial would be oppressive. The court therefore quashed the adjournment as unlawful and irrational and remitted the case with a direction to acquit: [78].

Conclusion

Malone both reaffirms the classic criteria for assessing late prosecution adjournments and removes any doubt about the breadth of the High Court’s remedial discretion when those criteria are ignored.