Upper Tribunal Rebukes DBS on Meaning of ‘Relevant Conduct’

LJCB v Disclosure and Barring Service [2025] UKUT 117 is a striking case in which the Upper Tribunal found that the DBS had erred in its decision to include the appellant in the adults’ barred list on the basis of a “personality assessment” rather than focusing on whether her conduct amounted to “relevant conduct” as required by the statutory regime.

LJCB was, at the time of the barring decision, a care worker. She was able to commence that work prior to the DBS’s barring decision and there was no suggestion of any failure at work. The substance of the DBS’s concern lay instead in her difficult domestic life. LJCB was approximately 30 years old and had endured multiple abusive relationships with men. Two children had been removed from her care by the Family Court in 2015 and 2022 in that context. Importantly, LJCB’s particular actions with respect to the children were not impugned, but the DBS in its decision commented adversely on her failure to protect her children from the abusive relationships. It was said that the DBS:

“… remains concerned that you demonstrated poor problem solving and coping skills in relation to being able to protect your children and as a result that they have been exposed to neglect, emotional and potentially physical harm …”

Under the provisions contained in Schedule 3 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, it is a condition precedent to joining the adults’ barred list that the person “has engaged in relevant conduct” (paragraph 9). “Relevant conduct” is defined in paragraph 10 as conduct “which endangers a vulnerable adult” or is likely to do so, and conduct “which, if repeated against or in relation to a vulnerable adult, would endanger that adult” or be likely to do so[1]. There is no definition of “conduct” itself.

The DBS considered that LJCB’s failure to safeguard her children amounted to conduct falling into the second category, that is, conduct “which if repeated” against a vulnerable adult might endanger them. It was said that:

“ If you neglected or failed to act appropriately to safeguard vulnerable adults as you are unable to cope or recognise problems and implement changes to address these where they exist this would represent a significant risk, as vulnerable adults rely on their carers to recognise and meet their needs… “

The Upper Tribunal found that the DBS’s decision in that respect was wrong, indeed that it met the “high threshold” of irrationality. The tribunal accepted that in principle there could be read-across between a person’s neglect of their children at home and the risk of negligent treatment of a vulnerable adult at work, but the DBS had failed in LJCB’s case to identify anything that LJCB “has actually done” that was capable of repetition in a professional care context. Employing strong language, the tribunal said that the “DBS is not, or should not be, in the business of barring someone simply on the basis of personality assessment.”

The tribunal did not remit the decision to the DCS on the basis that the only lawful decision on the evidence was that LJCB should not be barred, consequently directing her removal from the barred list.

[1] It is also defined by reference to a range of sexual misconduct, which was not relevant in LJCB